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Thursday, May 17, 2001

Clinton Rwanda Record

excerpted from Congressional Hearing before the
Subcommittee on International Operations and Human Rights


As U.S. troops and intelligence agents were pouring into Africa to help the RPF and AFDL-CZ forces in their 1996 campaign against Mobutu, Vincent Kern, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for African Affairs, told the House International Operations and Human Rights Subcommittee on December 4, 1996 that U.S. military training for the RPF was being conducted under a program called Enhanced International Military Education and Training (E-IMET). Kathi Austin, a Human Rights Watch specialist on arms transfers in Africa, told the Subcommittee on May 5, 1998 that one senior U.S. embassy official in Kigali described the U.S. Special Forces training program for the RPF as ¡°killers . . . training killers.¡±[9]

In November 1996, U.S. spy satellites and a U.S. Navy P-3 Orion were attempting to ascertain how many Rwandan Hutu refugees were in eastern Zaire. The P-3 was one of four stationed at old Entebbe Airport on the shores of Lake Victoria. Oddly, while other planes flying over eastern Zaire attracted anti-aircraft fire from Kabila¡¯s forces, the P-3s, which patrolled the skies above Goma and Sake, were left alone.[10]

Relying on the overhead intelligence, U.S. military and aid officials confidently announced that 600,000 Hutu refugees returned home to Rwanda from Zaire. But that left an estimated 300,000 unaccounted for. Many Hutus seemed to be disappearing from camps around Bukavu.

By December 1996, U.S. military forces were also operating in Bukavu amid throngs of Hutus, less numerous Twa refugees, Mai Mai guerrillas, advancing Rwandan troops, and AFDL-CZ rebels. A French military intelligence officer said he detected some 100 armed U.S. troops in the eastern Zaire conflict zone.[11]Moreover, the DGSE reported the Americans had knowledge of the extermination of Hutu refugees by Tutsis in both Rwanda and eastern Zaire and were doing nothing about it. More ominously, there was reason to believe that some U.S. forces, either Special Forces or mercenaries, may have actually participated in the extermination of Hutu refugees. The killings reportedly took place at a camp on the banks of the Oso River near Goma.[12] Roman Catholic reports claim that the executed included a number of Hutu Catholic priests. At least for those who were executed, death was far quicker than it was for those who escaped deep into the jungle. There, many died from tropical diseases or were attacked and eaten by wild animals.[13]

Jacques Isnard, the Paris based defense correspondent for Le Monde supported the contention of U.S. military knowledge of the Oso River massacre but went further. He quoted French intelligence sources that believed that between thirty and sixty American mercenary ¡°advisers¡± participated with the RPF in the massacre of hundreds of thousands of Hutu refugees around Goma. Although his number of Hutu dead was more conservative than the French estimates, the U.N.¡¯s Chilean investigator, Roberto Garreton, reported the Kagame and Kabila forces had committed ¡°crimes against humanity¡± in killing thousands [emphasis added] of Hutu refugees.[14]

It was known that the planes the U.S. military deployed in eastern Zaire included heavily armed and armored helicopter gunships typically used by the Special Forces. These were fitted with 105 mm cannons, rockets, machine guns, land mine ejectors, and, more importantly, infra red sensors used in night operations. U.S. military commanders unabashedly stated the purpose of these gunships was to locate refugees to determine the best means of providing them with humanitarian assistance.[15]

According to the French magazine Valeurs Actuelles, a French DC-8 Sarigue electronic intelligence (ELINT) aircraft circled over eastern Zaire at the time of the Oso River massacre. The Sarigue¡¯s mission was to intercept and fix the radio transmissions of Rwandan military units engaged in the military operations. This aircraft, in addition to French special ground units, witnessed U.S. military ethnic cleansing in Zaire¡¯s Kivu Province[16].

In September 1997, the prestigious Jane¡¯s Foreign Report reported that German intelligence sources were aware that the DIA trained young men and teens from Rwanda, Uganda, and eastern Zaire for periods of up to two years and longer for the RPF/AFDL-CZ campaign against Mobutu. The recruits were offered pay of between $450 and $1000 upon their successful capture of Kinshasa.[17]

Toward the end of 1996, U.S. spy satellites were attempting to ascertain how many refugees escaped into the jungle by locating fires at night and canvas tarpaulins during the day. Strangely, every time an encampment was discovered by the space-based imagery, Rwandan and Zaire rebel forces attacked the sites. This was the case in late February 1997, when 160,000, mainly Hutu refugees, were spotted and then attacked in a swampy area known as Tingi Tingi.[18] There was never an adequate accounting by the Pentagon and U.S. intelligence agencies of the scope of intelligence provided to the RPF/AFDL-CZ.

An ominous report on the fate of refugees was made by Nicholas Stockton, the Emergencies Director of Oxfam U.K. & Ireland. He said that on November 20, 1996, he was shown U.S. aerial intelligence photographs which ¡°confirmed, in considerable detail, the existence of 500,000 people distributed in three major and numerous minor agglomerations.¡± He said that three days later the U.S. military claimed it could only locate one significant mass of people, which they claimed were identified as former members of the Rwandan armed forces and the Interhamwe militia. Since they were the number one targets for the RPF forces, their identification and location by the Americans was undoubtedly passed to the Rwandan forces. They would have surely been executed.[19] Moreover, some U.S. military and diplomatic personnel in central Africa said that any deaths among the Hutu refugees merely constituted ¡°collateral damage.¡±

When the AFDL-CZ and their Rwandan allies reached Kinshasa in 1996, it was largely due to the help of the United States. One reason why Kabila¡¯s men advanced into the city so quickly was the technical assistance provided by the DIA and other intelligence agencies. According to informed sources in Paris, U.S. Special Forces actually accompanied ADFL-CZ forces into Kinshasa. The Americans also reportedly provided Kabila¡¯s rebels and Rwandan troops with high definition spy satellite photographs that permitted them to order their troops to plot courses into Kinshasa that avoided encounters with Mobutu¡¯s forces.[20] During the rebel advance toward Kinshasa, Bechtel provided Kabila, at no cost, high technology intelligence, including National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) satellite data.[21]


By 1998, the Kabila regime had become an irritant to the United States, North American mining interests, and Kabila¡¯s Ugandan and Rwandan patrons. As a result, Rwanda and Uganda launched a second invasion of the DRC to get rid of Kabila and replace him with someone more servile. The Pentagon was forced to admit on August 6, 1998 that a twenty man U.S. Army Rwanda Interagency Assessment Team (RIAT) was in the Rwanda at the time of the second RPF invasion of Congo. The camouflaged unit was deployed from the U.S. European Command in Germany.[22] It was later revealed that the team in question was a JCET unit that was sent to Rwanda to help the Rwandans ¡°defeat ex FAR (Rwandan Armed Forces) and Interhamwe¡± units. U.S. Special Forces JCET team began training Rwandan units on July 15, 1998. It was the second such training exercise held that year. The RIAT team was sent to Rwanda in the weeks just leading up to the outbreak of hostilities in Congo.[23] The RIAT, specializing in counter insurgency operations, traveled to Gisenyi on the Congolese border just prior to the Rwandan invasion.[24] One of the assessments of the team recommended that the United States establish a new and broader military relationship with Rwanda. National Security Council spokesman P. J. Crowley, said of the RIAT¡¯s presence in Rwanda: ¡°I think it¡¯s a coincidence that they were there at the same time the fighting began.¡±[25]

Soon, however, as other African nations came to the assistance of Laurent Kabila, the United States found itself in the position of providing military aid under both the E-IMET and the Joint Combined Exchange Training (JCET) programs. U.S. Special Operations personnel were involved in training troops on both sides of the war in the DRC ? Rwandans, Ugandans, and Burundians (supporting the RCD factions) and Zimbabweans and Namibians (supporting the central government in Kinshasa).

As with the first invasion, there were also a number of reports that the RPF and their RCD allies carried out a number of massacres throughout the DRC. The Vatican reported a sizable killing of civilians in August 1998 in Kasika, a small village in South Kivu that hosted a Catholic mission station. Over eight hundred people, including priests and nuns, were killed by Rwandan troops. The RCD response was to charge the Vatican with aiding Kabila. The Rwandans, choosing to put into practice what the DIA¡¯s PSYOPS personnel had taught them about mounting perception management campaigns, shepherded the foreign press to carefully selected killing fields. The dead civilians were identified as exiled Burundian Hutu militiamen. Unfortunately, many in the international community, still suffering a type of collective guilt over the genocide of the Tutsis in Rwanda, gave the Rwandan assertions more credence than was warranted.

The increasing reliance by the Department of Defense on so-called Private Military Contractors (PMCs) is of special concern. Many of these PMCs -- once labeled as ¡°mercenaries¡± by previous administrations when they were used as foreign policy instruments by the colonial powers of France, Belgium, Portugal, and South Africa -- have close links with some of the largest mining and oil companies involved in Africa today. PMCs, because of their proprietary status, have a great deal of leeway to engage in covert activities far from the reach of congressional investigators. They can simply claim that their business in various nations is a protected trade secret and the law now seems to be on their side.


America¡¯s policy toward Africa during the past decade, rather than seeking to stabilize situations where civil war and ethnic turmoil reign supreme, has seemingly promoted destabilization. Former Secretary of State Madeleine Albright was fond of calling pro-U.S. military leaders in Africa who assumed power by force and then cloaked themselves in civilian attire, ¡°beacons of hope.¡±

In reality, these leaders, who include the current presidents of Uganda, Rwanda, Ethiopia, Angola, Eritrea, Burundi, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo preside over countries where ethnic and civil turmoil permit unscrupulous international mining companies to take advantage of the strife to fill their own coffers with conflict diamonds, gold, copper, platinum, and other precious minerals ? including one ? columbite-tantalite or ¡°coltan¡± -- which is a primary component of computer microchips and printed circuit boards.

Some of the companies involved in this new ¡°scramble for Africa¡± have close links with PMCs and America¡¯s top political leadership. For example, America Minerals Fields, Inc., a company that was heavily involved in promoting the 1996 accession to power of Kabila, was, at the time of its involvement in the Congo¡¯s civil war, headquartered in Hope, Arkansas. Its major stockholders included long-time associates of former President Clinton going back to his days as Governor of Arkansas. America Mineral Fields also reportedly enjoys a close relationship with Lazare Kaplan International, Inc., a major international diamond brokerage whose president remains a close confidant of past and current administrations on Africa matters.[26]

The United States has a long history of supporting all sides in the DRC¡¯s civil wars in order to gain access to the country¡¯s natural resources. The Ba-N¡¯Daw Report presents a cogent example of how one U.S. firm was involved in the DRC¡¯s grand thievery before the 1998 break between Laurent Kabila and his Rwandan and Ugandan backers. It links the Banque de commerce, du developpement et d'industrie (BCDI) of Kigali, Citibank in New York, the diamond business and armed rebellion. The report states: ¡°In a letter signed by J.P. Moritz, general manager of Societe miniere de Bakwanga (MIBA), a Congolese diamond company, and Ngandu Kamenda, the general manager of MIBA ordered a payment of US$3.5 million to la Generale de commerce d'import/export du Congo (COMIEX), a company owned by late President Kabila and some of his close allies, such as Minister Victor Mpoyo, from an account in BCDI through a Citibank account. This amount of money was paid as a contribution from MIBA to the AFDL war effort.¡±

Also troubling are the ties that some mining companies in Africa have with military privateers. UN Special Rapporteur Enrique Ballesteros of Peru concluded in a his March 2001 report for the UN Commission on Human Rights, that mercenaries were inexorably linked to the illegal diamond and arms trade in Africa. He stated, ¡°Mercenaries participate in both types of traffic, acting as pilots of aircraft and helicopters, training makeshift troops in the use of weapons and transferring freight from place to place. Ballesteros added, ¡°Military security companies and air cargo companies registered in Nevada (the United States), in the Channel Islands and especially in South Africa and in Zimbabwe, are engaged in the transport of troops, arms, munitions, and diamonds.¡±

In 1998, America Minerals Fields purchased diamond concessions in the Cuango Valley along the Angolan-Congolese border from International Defense and Security (IDAS Belgium SA), a mercenary firm based in Curacao and headquartered in Belgium. According to an American Mineral Fields press release, ¡°In May 1996, America Mineral Fields entered into an agreement with IDAS Resources N.V. (¡°IDAS¡±) and IDAS shareholders, under which the Company may acquire 75.5% of the common shares of IDAS. In turn, IDAS has entered into a 50-50 joint venture agreement with Endiama, the Angola state mining company. The joint venture asset is a 3,700 km mining lease in the Cuango Valley, Luremo and a 36,000 km2 prospecting lease called the Cuango International, which borders the mining lease to the north. The total area is approximately the size of Switzerland.¡± [27]

America Mineral Fields directly benefited from America¡¯s initial covert military and intelligence support for Kabila. It is my observation that America¡¯s early support for Kabila, which was aided and abetted by U.S. allies Rwanda and Uganda, had less to do with getting rid of the Mobutu regime than it had to do with opening up Congo¡¯s vast mineral riches to North American-based and influenced mining companies. Presently, some of America Mineral Fields¡¯ principals now benefit from the destabilization of Sierra Leone and the availability of its cut-rate ¡°blood diamonds¡± on the international market. Also, according to the findings of a commission headed up by Canadian United Nations Ambassador, Robert Fowler, Rwanda has violated the international embargo against Angola¡¯s UNITA rebels in allowing the ¡°to operate more or less freely¡± in selling conflict zone diamonds and making deals with weapons dealers in Kigali.[28]

One of the major goals of the Rwandan-backed RCD-Goma faction, a group fighting the Kabila government in Congo, is restoration of mining concessions for Barrick Gold, Inc. of Canada. In fact, the rebel RCD government¡¯s ¡°mining minister¡± signed a separate mining deal with Barrick in early 1999.[29] Among the members of Barrick¡¯s International Advisory Board are former President Bush and former President Clinton¡¯s close confidant Vernon Jordan.

Currently, Barrick and tens of other mining companies are helping to stoke the flames of the civil war in the DRC. Each benefits by the de facto partition of the country into some four separate zones of political control. First the mineral exploiters from Rwanda and Uganda concentrated on pillaging gold and diamonds from the eastern Congo. Now, they have increasingly turned their attention to col-tan.

It is my hope that the Bush administration will take pro-active measures to stem the conflict in the DRC by applying increased pressure on Uganda and Rwanda to withdraw their troops from the country. However, the fact that President Bush has selected Walter Kansteiner to be Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, portends, in my opinion, more trouble for the Great Lakes region. A brief look at Mr. Kansteiner¡¯s curriculum vitae and statements calls into question his commitment to seeking a durable peace in the region.

In an October 15, 1996 paper written by Mr. Kansteiner for the Forum for International Policy on the then-eastern Zaire, he called for the division of territory in the Great Lakes region ¡°between the primary ethnic groups, creating homogenous ethnic lands that would probably necessitate redrawing international boundaries and would require massive ¡®voluntary¡¯ relocation efforts.¡± Kansteiner foresaw creating separate Tutsi and Hutu states after such a drastic population shift. It should be recalled that the creation of a Tutsi state in eastern Congo was exactly what Rwanda, Uganda and their American military advisers had in mind when Rwanda invaded then-Zaire in 1996, the same year Kansteiner penned his plans for the region. Four years later, Kansteiner was still convinced that the future of the DRC was ¡°balkanization¡± into separate states. In an August 23, 2000 Pittsburgh Post-Gazette article, Kansteiner stated that the ¡°breakup of the Congo is more likely now than it has been in 20 or 30 years.¡± Of course, the de facto break up of Congo into various fiefdoms has been a boon for U.S. and other western mineral companies. And I believe Kansteiner¡¯s previous work at the Department of Defense where he served on a Task Force on Strategic Minerals ? and one must certainly consider col-tan as falling into that category -- may influence his past and current thinking on the territorial integrity of the DRC. After all, 80 per cent of the world¡¯s known reserves of col-tan are found in the eastern DRC. It is potentially as important to the U.S. military as the Persian Gulf region.

However, the U.S. military and intelligence agencies, which have supported Uganda and Rwanda in their cross-border adventures in the DRC, have resisted peace initiatives and have failed to produce evidence of war crimes by the Ugandans and Rwandans and their allies in Congo. The CIA, NSA, and DIA should turn over to international and congressional investigators intelligence-generated evidence in their possession, as well as overhead thermal imagery indicating the presence of mass graves and when they were dug. In particular, the NSA maintained a communications intercept station in Fort Portal, Uganda, which intercepted military and government communications in Zaire during the first Rwandan invasion. These intercepts may contain details of Rwandan and AFDL-CZ massacres of innocent Hutu refugees and other Congolese civilians during the 1996 invasion. There must be a full accounting before the Congress by the staff of the U.S. Defense Attache¡¯s Office in Kigali and certain U.S. Embassy staff members in Kinshasa who served from early 1994 to the present time.

As for the number of war casualties in the DRC since the first invasion from Rwanda in 1996, I would estimate, from my own research, the total to be around 1.7 to 2 million ? a horrendous number by any calculation. And I also believe that although disease and famine were contributing factors, the majority of these deaths were the result of actual war crimes committed by Rwandan, Ugandan, Burundian, AFDL-CZ, RCD, and military and paramilitary forces of other countries.


It is beyond time for the Congress to seriously examine the role of the United States in the genocide and civil wars of central Africa, as well as the role that PMCs currently play in other African trouble spots like Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Equatorial Guinea, Angola, Ethiopia, Sudan, and Cabinda. Other nations, some with less than stellar records in Africa ? France and Belgium, for example ? have had no problem examining their own roles in Africa¡¯s last decade of turmoil. The British Foreign Office is in the process of publishing a green paper on regulation of mercenary activity. At the very least, the United States, as the world¡¯s leading democracy, owes Africa at least the example of a critical self-inspection.

I appreciate the concern shown by the Chair and members of this committee in holding these hearings.

Thank you.

Wayne Madsen

[9] Dana Priest, ¡°Pentagon Slow to Cooperate With Information Requests,¡±

. . THE WASHINGTON POST, 31 December 1998, A34.

[10] Christian Jennings, ¡°U.S. plane seeks ¡°missing¡± refugees in east Zaire,¡±

. . Reuters North American Wire, 26 November 1996.

[11] Lynch, op. cit.

[12] Hubert Condurier, ¡°Ce que les services secrets francais savaient¡±

. . ("What the French Secret Services Knew¡±), VALEURS ACTUELLES, 30 August 1997, 26 27.

[13] Priests Speak of Massacres, Destitution,¡±

. . All Africa Press Service, AFRICA NEWS, 24 March 1997.

[14] Lara Marlowe, "Rwandans got combat training from U.S. army, paper claims,¡±

. . THE IRISH TIMES, 28 August 1997, 11.

[15] Condurier, 27.

[16] Ibid.

[17] ¡°Helping Africa to help America,¡± JANE'S FOREIGN REPORT, 4 September 1997.

[18] Donald G. McNeil, Jr., ¡°In Congo, Forbidding Terrain Hides a Calamity,¡±

. . THE NEW YORK TIMES, 1 June 1997, 4.

[19] Edward Mortimer, ¡°The moral maze: The dilemmas of African conflict

. . cannot be avoided by identifying one side as victims and the other

. . as aggressors,¡± FINANCIAL TIMES, 12 February 1997, 24.

[20] ¡°Oil Wars in the Congo,¡± ASIA TIMES, op. cit; Frederic Francois,

. . "A la recontre du Kivu libere: carnet de route (janvier-fevrier 97)¡±

. . (¡°Recounting the liberation of Kivu: the roadmap (January February 1997),¡±

. . Marc Schmitz and Sophie Nolet, op. cit., 57.

[21] Robert Block, ¡°U.S. Firms Seek Deals in Central Africa,¡±

. . THE WALL STREET JOURNAL, 14 October 1997.

[22]Milan Vesely, ¡°Carving up the Congo,¡± AFRICAN BUSINESS, October 1998, 12;

. . http://www.marekinc.com/NCNSpecialDRCWar080198.html

[23] Lynne Duke, ¡°Africans Use Training in Unexpected Ways,¡± THE WASHINGTON POST,

. . 14 July 1998, A10

[24] ¡°Washington urges peace as U.S. team goes to Rwanda,¡± Agence France Presse,

. . 5 Aug 1998.

[25] Colum Lynch, ¡°Congo, Rwanda appear headed to full scale war,¡±

. . THE BOSTON GLOBE, 6 August 1998, A1.

[26] Richard Morais, ¡°Friends in High Places,¡± FORBES, August 10, 1998, 50.

[27] http://www.am-min.com/amf/96/news/jan14-98.html

[28] ¡°RWANDA: Government denies busting UNITA sanctions,¡±

. . UN Integrated Regional Information Network (IRIN), March 13, 2000.

[29] ¡°Former Okimo Boss Named Rebels¡¯ ¡®Minister¡¯,¡±
. . AFRICA ENERGY & MINING, No. 245, February 3, 1999.