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Saturday, October 30, 1993




(1) The Problem Stated

What is the essential difference between the primitive and the higher societies? It does not consist in the presence or absence of institutions for institutions are the vehicles of the impersonal relations between individuals in which all societies have their existence, because even the smallest of primitive societies is built on a wider basis than the narrow circle of an individual's direct personal ties. Institutions are attributes of the whole genus "societies" and therefore common properties of both its species. Primitive societies have their institutions—the religion of the annual agricultural cycle; totemism and exogamy; tabus, initiations and age-classes; segregations of the sexes, at certain stages of life, in separate communal establishment—and some of these institutions are certainly as elaborate and perhaps as subtle as those which are characteristic of civilizations.

Nor are civilizations distinguished from primitive societies by the Division of Labour, for we can discern at least the rudiments of the Division of Labour in the lives of primitive societies also. Kings, magicians, smiths and minstrels are all "specialists" though the fact that Hephaestus, the smith of Hellenic legend, is lame, and Homer, the poet of Hellenic legends, is blind, suggests that in primitive societies specialism is abnormal and apt to be confined to those who lack the capacity to be "all-round men" or 'lacks of all trades."

{II.B.p.190} Indeed, The Division of Labour may be a necessary condition of the existence of institutions and therefore a generic feature in the lives of societies, since it is difficult to conceive how institutions could exist without in some way being embodied in the persons of particular human who are thus invested with special social functions. In primitive societies these incarnations are sometimes complete—the institutions and their human embodiments being absolutely identified with one another in the thoughts and feelings of those who participate in the social relations that are maintained by this means. In civilizations there is usually a greater ability to distinguish offices from office-holders and personalities from titles and uniforms; and there is sometimes a conscious endeavour to eliminate the personal factor and to place those essentially impersonal relations on an avowedly impersonal basis. In the United States, where official titles have been abolished and official uniforms reduced to a minimum, the ingrained desire for these outward shows has found non-official outlets—for instance, the ceremonials of private associations like the Rotarians or the Elks or the Knights of Columbus or the Daughters of the American Revolution or the Ku-Klux-Klan. In the British Empire, where 'the Crown' has been piously preserved after its powers have been transferred to half a dozen parliaments, this medieval incarnation of political unity has latterly acquired a new unforeseen institutional value as the trait d'union between the States members of the British Commonwealth of Nations. The relation in which these nations stand, and wish to stand, towards one another involves a logical antimony between the parlimentary self-government of each State member and the political unity of the Commonwealth as a whole; and hence this relation cannot be expressed in the
{p.191} logical terms of a constitutional relation between the parliaments that have severally inherited the powers once possessed by 'the Crown'. On the other hand, it can and does find expression in the incarnate institution of a personal monarch who 'reigns but does not govern' in each of his dominions.

Here we see an apparent anachronism acquiring a new value in anew age. Yet in every society institutions depend for their maintenance upon the services of specialists in some measure; and in that measure these human beings become invested with symbolic significance and prestige in their fellows' hearts and minds. This happens even in spheres of life in which tradition is at a discount. While millions of human beings who think of themselves as British subjects find their incarnations of the British Empire in the King of in the Prince of Wales, other millions who think of themselves as American citizens find their incarnations of 'Americanism' in Edison, or in Henry Ford. For almost all Westerners in our generation, the prowess of the Western Society in abstract science is incarnated in Einstein, its prowess in applied science in Marconi, its spirit of adventure in Lindbergh, its physical skill in its professional athletes, its physical strength in its professional pugilists, its physical beauty in its film-stars. It is a universal condition of social life that the majority of its members of any given society should be perpetually extending the narrow radius of their personal lives by living vicariously through the representative activities of a small number of their fellows; and the Division of labour between this majority and this minority is inherent in the nature of Society itself.

The compliment and antidote to the Division of labour is social imitation of mimesis,1 which may be defined as the acquisition, through imitation, of social 'assets'—aptitudes or emotions or ideas—which the acquisitors have not originated for themselves, and which they might never had come to possess if they had not encountered and imitated other people in whose possession these assets were already to be found. Mimesis, too is a generic feature of social life.2 Its operation can be observed both in primitive societies and in civilizations. It operates, however, in different

1 In this study, the Greek word (μίμησις from μιμεîσθαι) is used in order to avoid the connotations of 'unintelligent imitation' or 'satirical imitation' which attach to the derivative English word 'mimicry'. Mimesis, as used here, denotes social imitation 'without prejudice'.
2 The historical importance of mimesis was discerned by David Hume, as witness the following passage in his essay Of National Characters: The human mind is of a very imitative nature; nor is it possible for any set of men to converse often together without acquiring a similitude of manners and communication to each other their vices as well as their virtues. The propensity to company and society is strong in all rational creatures; and the same disposition which gives us this propensity makes us enter deeply into each other's sentiments and causes like passions and inclinations to run, as it were, by contagion through the whole club or knot of companions.'

{p.192} directions of the two species. In primitive societies, as we know them, mimesis is directed towards the older generation of the living members, and towards the dead ancestors who stand, unseen but not unfelt, at the back of the living elders, reinforcing their power and enhancing their prestige. In a society where mimesis is thus directed backward towards the past, custom rules and the society remains static. On the other hand, in societies in process of civilization, mimesis is directed towards creative personalities which command a following because they are pioneers on the road towards the common goal of human endeavours. In a society where mimesis is thus directed forward towards the future, 'the cake of custom', 1 is broken and the Society is in dynamic motion along a course of change and growth.

1 Bagehot, W.: Physics and Politics, 10th edition (London 1894, Kegan Paul), pp. 27 and 35.

But if we ask ourselves whether this difference between primitive and higher societies is permanent and fundamental, we must answer in the negative; for, if we only know primitive societies in a static condition, that is because we know them from direct observation only in the last phases of their histories. Yet, though direct observation fails us, a train of reasoning informs us that there must have been earlier phases in the histories of primitive societies in which these were moving more dynamically than any 'civilized' society has moved yet. We have said that primitive societies are as old as the human race, but we should more properly have said that they are older. Social and institutional life of a kind is found among some of the higher mammals other than man, and it is clear that mankind could not have become human except in a social environment. This mutation of sub-man into man, which was accomplished, in circumstances of which we have no record, under the aegis of primitive societies, was a more profound change, a greater step in growth, than any progress which man has yet achieved under the aegis of civilization.

Primitive societies, as we know them by direct observation, may be likened to people lying torpid upon a ledge on a mountain-side, with a precipice below and a precipice above; civilizations may be likened to companions of these sleepers who have just risen to their feet and have started to climb up the face of the cliff above; while we for our part may liken ourselves to observers whose field of vision is limited to the ledge and to the lower slopes of the upper precipice and who have come upon the scene at the moment when the different members of the party happen to be in these respective postures and positions. At first sight we may be inclined to draw an absolute distinction between the two groups, acclaiming the climbers as athletes and dismissing the recumbent figures as paralytics; but on second thoughts we shall find it more prudent to suspend judgment.

After all the recumbent figures cannot be paralytics in reality; for they cannot have been horn on the ledge, and no human muscles except their own can have hoisted them to this halting-place up the face of the precipice below. On the other hand, their companions who are climbing at the moment have only just left this same ledge and started to climb the precipice above; and, since the next ledge is out of sight, we do not know how high or how arduous the next pitch may be. We only know that it
is impossible to halt and rest before the next ledge, wherever that may lie, is reached. Thus, even if we could estimate each present climber's strength and skill and nerve, we could not judge whether any of them have any prospect of gaining the ledge above, which is the goal of their present endeavours. We can, however, be sure that some of them will never attain it. And we can observe that, for every single one now strenuously climbing, twice that number (our extinct civilization) have fallen back onto the ledge, defeated.

This alternating rhythm of static and dynamic, of movement and pause and movement, has been regarded by many observers in many different ages as something fundamental in the nature of the Universe. In their pregnant imagery the sages of the Sinic4 Society described these alternations in terms of Yin and Yang -- Yin the static and Yang the dynamic. The nucleus of the Sinic character which stands for Yin seems to represent dark coiling clouds overshadowing the Sun, while the nucleus of the character which stands for Yang seems to represent the unclouded sun-disk emitting its rays. In the Chinese formula Yin is always mentioned first, and within our field of vision, we can see that our breed, having reached the "ledge" of primitive human nature 300,000 years ago, has reposed there for ninety-eight per cent of that period before entering on the Yang-activity of civilization. We have now to seek for the positive factor, whatever it may be, which has set human life in motion again by its impetus.


(1) The Mythological Clue

An encounter between two superhuman personalities is the plot of some of the greatest dramas that the human imagination has conceived. An encounter between Yahweh5 and the Serpent is the plot of the story of the Fall of Man in the Book of Genesis; a second encounter between the same antagonists, transfigured by a progressive enlightenment of Syriac souls, is the plot of the New Testament which tells the story of the Redemption; an encounter between the Lord and Satan is the plot of the Book of Job; an encounter between the Lord and Mephistopheles is the
plot of Goethe's Faust; an encounter between Gods and Demons is the plot of the Scandinavian Voluspa6 an encounter between Artemis and Aphrodite7 is the plot of Euripides' Hippolytus.

We find another version of the same plot in that ubiquitous and ever-recurring myth -- a "primordial image" if ever there was one -- of the encounter between the Virgin and the Father of her Child. The characters in this myth have played their allotted parts on a thousand different stages under an infinite variety of names: Danae and the Shower of Gold; Europa and the Bull; Semele the Stricken Earth and Zeus the Sky that launches the thunderbolt; Creusa and Apollo in Euripides' Ion; Psyche and Cupid; Gretchen and Faust. The theme recurs, transfigured, in the Annunciation. In our own day in the West this protean myth has re-expressed itself as the last word of our astronomers on the genesis of the planetary system, as witness the following credo:

"We believe…that some two thousand million years ago…a second star, wandering blindly through space, happened to come within hailing distance of the Sun. Just as the Sun and Moon raise tides on the Earth, this second star must have raised tides on the surface of the Sun. But they would be very different from the puny tides which the small mass of the Moon raises in our oceans; a huge tidal wave must have travelled over the surface of the Sun, ultimately forming a mountain of prodigious height, which would rise ever higher and higher as the cause of the disturbance came nearer and nearer. And, before the second star began to recede, its tidal pull had become so powerful that this mountain was torn to pieces and threw off small fragments of itself, much as the crest of a wave throws off spray. These small fragments have been circulating round their parent sun ever since. They are the planets, great and small, of which our Earth is one."8

Thus out of the mouth of the mathematical astronomer, when all his complex calculations are done, there comes forth, once again, the myth of the encounter between the Sun Goddess and her ravisher that is so familiar a tale in the mouths of the untutored children of nature.

The presence and potency of this duality in the causation of the civilizations whose genesis we are studying is admitted by a Modern Western archaeologist whose studies begin with a concentration on environment and end with an intuition of the mystery of life:

"Environment … is not the total causation in culture-shaping. …It is, beyond doubt, the most conspicuous single factor. …But there is still an indefinable factor which may best be designated quite frankly as x, the unknown quantity, apparently psychological in kind. …If x be not the most conspicuous factor in the matter, it certainly is the most important, the most fate4aden."9

In our present study of history this insistent theme of the superhuman encounter has asserted itself already. At an early stage we observed that "a society … is confronted in the course of its life by a succession of problems" and that "the presentation of each problem is a challenge to undergo an ordeal."

Let us try to analyse the plot of this story or drama which repeats itself in such different contexts and in such various forms. We may begin with two general features: the encounter is conceived of as a rare and sometimes as a unique event; and it has consequences which are vast in proportion to the vastness of the breach which it makes in the customary course of nature.

Even in the easy-going world of Hellenic mythology, where the gods saw the daughters of men that they were fair, and had their way with so many of them that their victims could be marshalled and paraded in poetic catalogues, such incidents never ceased to be sensational affairs and invariably resulted in the births of heroes. In the versions of the plot in which both parties to the encounter are superhuman, the rarity and momentousness of the event are thrown into stronger relief. In the Book of Job, "the day when the Sons of Cod came to present themselves before the Lord, and Satan came also among them," is evidently conceived of as an unusual occasion; and so is the encounter between the
Lord and Mephistopheles in the "Prologue in Heaven" (suggested, of course, by the opening of the Book of Job) which starts the action of Goethe's Faust. In both these dramas the consequences on Earth of the encounter in Heaven are tremendous. The personal ordeals of Job and Faust represent, in the intuitive language of fiction, the infinitely multiple ordeal of mankind; and, in the language of theology, the same vast consequence is represented as following from the superhuman encounters that are portrayed in the Book of Genesis and in the New Testament. The expulsion of Adam and Eve from the Garden of Eden, which follows the encounter between Yahweh and the Serpent, is nothing less than the Fall of Man; the passion of Christ in the New Testament is nothing less than Man's Redemption. Even the birth of our planetary system from the encounter of two suns, as pictured by our modern astronomer, is declared by the same authority to be "an event of almost unimaginable rarity."

In every case the story opens with a perfect state of Yin. Faust is perfect in knowledge; Job is perfect in goodness and prosperity; Adam and Eve are perfect in innocence and ease; the Virgins -- Gretchen, Danae and the rest -- are perfect in purity and beauty. In the astronomer's universe the Sun, a perfect orb, travels on its course intact and whole. When Yin is thus complete, it is ready to pass over into Yang. But what is to make it pass? A change in a state which, by definition, is perfect after its kind can only he started by an impulse or motive which comes from outside. If we think of the state as one of physical equilibrium, we must bring in another star. If we think of it as one of psychic beatitude or nirvana,10 we must bring another actor on to the stage: a critic to set the mind thinking again by suggesting doubts; an adversary to set the heart feeling again by instilling distress or discontent or fear or antipathy. This is the role of the Serpent in Genesis, of Satan in the Book of Job, or Mephistopheles in Faust, of Loki in the Scandinavian mythology, of the Divine Lovers in the Virgin myths.

In the language of science we may say that the function of the intruding factor is to supply that on which it intrudes with a stimulus of the kind best calculated to evoke the most potently creative variations. In the language of mythology and theology, the impulse or motive which makes a perfect Yin-state pass over into new Yang-activity comes from an intrusion of the Devil into the universe of God. The event can best be described in these mythological images because they are not embarrassed by the contradiction that arises when the statement is translated into logical terms. In logic, if God's universe is perfect, there cannot he a Devil outside it, while, if the Devil exists, the perfection which he comes to spoil must have been incomplete already through the very fact of his existence. This logical contradiction, which cannot be logically resolved, is intuitively transcended in the imagery of the poet and prophet, who give glory to an omnipotent God yet take it for granted that He is subject to two crucial limitations.

The first limitation is that, in the perfection of what He has created already, He cannot find an opportunity for further creative activity. If God is conceived of as transcendent, the works of creation are as glorious as ever they were but they cannot "be changed from glory into glory." The second limitation on God's power is that when the opportunity for fresh creation is offered to Him from outside He cannot but take it. When the Devil challenges Him He cannot refuse to take the challenge up. God is bound to accept the predicament because He can refuse only at the price of denying His own nature and ceasing to be God.

If God is thus not omnipotent in logical terms, is He still
mythologically invincible? If He is bound to take up the Devil's
challenge, is He also bound to win the ensuing battle? In Euripides' Hippolytus, where God's part is played by Artemis and the Devil's by Aphrodite, Artemis is not only unable to decline the combat but is foredoomed to defeat. The relations between the Olympians are anarchic and Artemis in the epilogue can console herself only by making up her mind that one day she will play the Devil's role herself at Aphrodite's expense. The result is not creation but destruction. In the Scandinavian version destruction is likewise the outcome in Ragnarok11 - when "Gods and Demons slay and are slain" -- though the unique genius of the author of Voluspa makes his Sibyl's vision pierce the gloom to behold the light of a new dawn beyond it. On the other hand, in another version of the plot, the combat which follows the compulsory acceptance of the challenge takes the form, not of an exchange of fire in which the Devil bas the first shot and cannot fail to kill his man, but of a wager which the Devil is apparently hound to lose. The classic works in which this wager motif is worked out are the Book of Job and Goethe's Faust.

It is in Goethe's drama that the point is most clearly made. After the Lord has accepted the wager with Mephistopheles in Heaven, the terms are agreed on Earth, between Mephistopheles and Faust, as follows:

Comfort and quite-no, no! None of these
For me-I ask them not-I seek them not.
If ever I upon the bed of sloth
Lie down and rest, then be the hour in which
I so lie down and rest my last of life.
Canst thou by falsehood or by flattery
Delude me into self-complacent ~miles,
Cheat me into tranquillity? Come then,
And welcome, life's last day-he this our wager.


Done, say I: clench we at once the bargain.
Soothing my spirits in such oblivion
That in the pleasut trance I would arrest
And hail the happy moment in its course,
Bidding it linger with me. …
Then willingly do I consent to perish.12

The bearing of this mythical compact upon our problem of the genesis of civilizations can he brought out by identifying Faust, at the moment when he makes his bet, with one of those "awakened sleepers" who have risen from the ledge on which they had been lying torpid and have started to climb on up the face of the cliff. In the language of our simile, Faust is saying: "I have made up my mind to leave this ledge and climb this precipice in search of the next ledge above. In attempting this I am aware that I am leaving safety behind me. Yet, for the sake of the possibility of achievement, I will take the risk of a fall and destruction."

In the story as told by Goethe the intrepid climber, after an ordeal of mortal dangers and desperate reverses, succeeds in the end in scaling the cliff triumphantly. In the New Testament the same ending is given, through the revelation of a second encounter between the same pair of antagonists, to the combat between Yahweh and the Serpent which, in the original version in Genesis, had ended rather in the manner of the combat between Artemis and Aphrodite in the Hippolytus.

In Job, Faust and the New Testament alike it is suggested, or even declared outright, that the wager cannot be won by the Devil; that the Devil, in meddling with God's work, cannot frustrate but can only serve the purpose of God, who remains master of the situation all the time and gives the Devil rope for the Devil to hang himself. Then has the Devil been created? Did God accept a wager which He knew He could not lose? That would be a hard saying; for if it were true the whole transaction would have been a sham. An encounter which was no encounter could not produce the consequences of an encounter -- the vast cosmic consequence of causing Yin to pass over into Yang. Perhaps the explanation is that the wager which the Devil offers and which Cod accepts covers, and thereby puts in real jeopardy, a part of God's creation but not the whole of it. The part really is at stake; and, though the whole is not, the chances and changes to which the part is exposed cannot conceivably leave the whole unaffected. In the language of mythology, when one of God's creatures is tempted by the Devil, God Himself is thereby given the opportunity to re-create the World. The Devil's intervention, whether it succeeds or fails on the particular issue and either result is possible -- has accomplished that transition from Yin to Yang for which God has been yearning.

As for the human protagonist's part, suffering is the keynote of it in every presentation of the drama, whether the player of the part is Jesus or Job or Faust or Adam and Eve. The picture of Adam and Eve in the Garden of Eden is a reminiscence of the Yin-state to which primitive man attained in the food-gathering phase of economy, after he had established his ascendancy over the rest of the flora and fauna of the Earth. The Fall, in response to the temptation to eat of the Tree of the Knowledge of Good and Evil, symbolizes the acceptance of a challenge to abandon this achieved integration and to venture upon a fresh differentiation out of which a fresh integration may -- or may not -- arise. The expulsion from the Garden into an unfriendly world in which the Woman must bring forth children in sorrow and the Man must eat bread in the sweat of his face, is the ordeal which the acceptance of the Serpent's challenge has entailed. The sexual intercourse between Adam and Eve, which follows, is an act of social creation. It bears fruit in the birth of two sons who impersonate two nascent civilizations: Abel the keeper of sheep and Cain the tiller of the ground.

In our own generation, one of our most distinguished and original-minded students of the physical environment of human life tells the same story in his own way:

"Ages ago a band of naked, houseless, fireless savages started from their warm home in the torrid zone and pushed steadily northward from the beginning of spring to the end of summer. They never guessed that they had left the land of constant warmth until in September they began to feel an uncomfortable chill at night. Day by day it grew worse. Not knowing its cause, they travelled this way or that to escape. Some went southward, but only a handful returned to their former home. There they resumed the old life, and their descendants are untutored savages to this day. Of those who wandered in other directions, all perished except one small band. Finding that they could not escape the nipping air, the members of this band used the loftiest of human faculties, the power of conscious invention. Some tried to find shelter by digging in the ground, some gathered branches and leaves to make huts and warm beds, and some wrapped themselves in the skins of the beasts that they had slain. Soon these savages had taken some of the greatest steps towards civilization. The naked were clothed; the houseless sheltered; the improvident learnt to dry meat and store it, with nuts, for the winter; and at last the art of preparing fire was discovered as a means of keeping warm. Thus they subsisted where at first they thought that they were doomed. And in the process of adjusting themselves to a hard environment they advanced by enormous strides, leaving the tropical part of mankind far in the rear.13

A classical scholar likewise translates the story into the scientific terminology of our age:
"It is ... a paradox of advancement that, if Necessity be the mother of Invention the other parent is Obstinacy, the determination that you will go on living under adverse conditions rather than cut your losses and go where life is easier. It was no accident, that is, that civilization, as we know it, began in that ebb and flow of climate, flora and fauna which characterizes the fourfold Ice Age. Those primates who just 'got out' as arboreal conditions wilted retained their primacy among the servants of natural law, but they forewent the conquest of nature. Those others won through, and became men, who stood their ground when they were no more trees to Sit in, who 'made do' with meat when fruit did not ripen, who made fires and clothes rather than follow the sunshine; who fortified their lairs and trained their young and vindicated the reasonableness of a world that seemed so reasonless."14

The first stage, then, of the human protagonist's ordeal is a
transition from Yin to Yang through a dynamic act - performed by God's creature under temptation from the Adversary -- which enables God Himself to resume His creative activity. But this progress has to be paid for; and it is not God but God's servant, the human sower, who pays the price. Finally, after many vicissitudes, the sufferer triumphant serves as the pioneer. The human protagonist in the divine drama not only serves God by enabling Him to renew His creation but also serves his fellow men by pointing the way for others to follow.

(2) The Myth Applied To The Problem

The Unpredictable Factor

By the light of mythology we have gained some insight into the nature of challenges and responses. We have come to see that creation is the outcome of an encounter, that genesis is a product of interaction. …We shall no longer be surprised if, in the production of civilizations, the same race or the same environment appears to be fruitful in one instance and sterile in another. …We shall be prepared now to recognize that, even if we were exactly acquainted with all the racial, environmental, and other data that are capable of being formulated scientifically, we should not be able to predict the outcome of the interaction between the forces which these data represent, any more than a military expert can predict the outcome of a battle or campaign from an "inside knowledge" of the dispositions and resources and both the opposing general staffs, or a bridge expert the outcome of a game from a similar knowledge of all the cards in every hand.

In both these analogies "inside knowledge" is not sufficient to enable its possessor to predict results with any exactness or assurance because it is not the same thing as complete knowledge. There is one thing which must remain an unknown quantity to the best-informed onlooker because it is beyond the knowledge of the combatants, or players, themselves; and it is the most important term in the equation which the would-be calculator has to solve. This unknown quantity is the reaction of the actors to the ordeal when it actually comes. These psychological momenta, which are inherently impossible to weigh and measure and therefore to estimate scientifically in advance, are the very forces which actually decide the issue when the encounter takes place. And that is why the very greatest military geniuses have admitted an incalculable element in their successes. If religious, they have attributed their victories to God, like Cromwell; if merely superstitious, to the ascendancy of their "star," like

1 The Greek god of fire, metallurgy, and and craftsmanship.

2 Something important to remember, a significant reservation.

3 Nineteenth-century economist.

4 "Sinic" refers to the Chinese.

5 Jehovah.

6 An ancient epic poem in Old Norse.

7 The play by Euripides focuses on Aphrodite's (the goddess of love)
revenue against Hippolytus, who was vowed to chastity as a follower of
Artemis (Diana).

8 Sir James Jeans, The Mysterious Universe (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1930), pp.1-2.

9 P. A. Means, Ancient Civilizations of the Andes (New York and
London: Scribners, 1931), pp.25-26.

10 In Buddhism, a state of enlightenment free from passion and

11 In the Volupsa, a destructive battle between the gods and
the powers of evil led by Loki, gives way to a vision (by the Sibyl,
Voluspa) of a world resurrected through the efforts of the god Balder,
where the sole surviving human beings, called "Life" and "Desiring
Life" repopulate the earth.

12 Faust, 11. 1692-1706 (John Anster's translation).

13 Ellsworth Huntington, Civilization and Climate, 3rd
edition (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1924), pp.405-406.

14 J. L. Myers, Who Were the Greeks? (Berkeley: University of
California Press, 1930), pp. 277-278.

I. C I (b) Annex I:

Note by Professor H.A. R. Gibb

{p. 400} The following valuable note on the first draft of this Annex (which later has been amended accordingly) has been communicated to the writer by Professor H. A. R. Gibb:

‘The chief point which I should question is the historical survey of the Shī‛ah background, and especially the tendency to identify it with Persia as “the principal expression of an Iranian social consciousness” in opposition to the Arabs. Though this view had powerful backing of Professor E. G. Browne, I do not think it can be sustained. The real history of Shi‛ism is still uncertain, but there are several facts which are now more or less generally accepted.

‘I. The historic centre of Shi‛ism is Lower ‛Irāq, where Arab, Aramaic, and Persian elements were most closely mingled. Its existence in all other centres—Bahrayn, Jabal Summāq and Jabal ‛Āmil districts of Syria, Qumm, N.W. Persia, Yaman, &c.—was due to propagation, directly of indirectly, from ‛Irāq. Specially noteworthy is the very small extent of the areas of Persia in which the Shī‛ah were in a
{p.401} majority—only Daylam and the neighbourhood, and one or two isolated towns, notably Qumm and Mashad—and Qumm was an Arab colony from Kūfah.

‘2. Elsewhere in Persia, Shi‛ism appears to have been associated with a special element in the population of the great cities, provisionally identified with the artisan classes, as an expression of “class-consciousness” against the aristocracy, whether Arab or Iranian, or in later times Turkish. Thus the Shī‛ah were opposed to the Iranian dynasty of the Sāmānids (which certainly embodied a reviving Iranian social consciousness) quite as much as to the ‛Abbasids or the Turkish princes. Even in Daylam it may be regarded as a movement directed against the feudal aristocracy, who were (with rare exceptions) supporters of the Sunnī “Established Church”.

‛3. Shi‛ism was thus in close relations with the trade guilds, and its is noteworthy that the Fātimids are credited with having done a great deal to foster the development of trade guilds in their dominions.

‘4. The political failure of the Shi‛ite movements under the Buwayhids. Fātimids, and Carmathians probably played its part in producing a fresh orientation of this social movement in the form of religious brotherhoods under Sūfī auspices. While the specifically doctrinal variations of Shi‛ism were rejected in the new organizations (at least for the most part), its programme of social reform and its historical theory, which was concentrated upon ‛Alī, passed over into them; and it is significant that the ceremonies of initiation &c., were taken over with some modifications from those of the trade guilds.

‛5. Thus, during the 6th (12th) and 7th (13th) centuries, by an act of unconscious statesmanship and the exercise of a wide toleration, the Sunnī community succeeded in absorbing, or at least reaching a kind of “Ausgleich” with, the greater part of moderate Shi‘ism, and the extreme forms were practically rooted out.

‛6. In the 8th (14th) century, it is evident from Ibn Battūtah that Lower ‘Irāq was still (with al-Hasā and Bahrayn) the chief centre of Shi‘ism. It would seem that relations between Shi‘ites and Sunnīs were temporarily exacerbated by competition for favour of the Mongol Il-Khans, but Baghdad, Shīrāz, and Isfahān are specifically mentioned as centres of resistance to the efforts of the Shi‘ites.

‛7. Ismā‛īl Shāh Safawī’s action seems to me in consequence a particularly wanton abuse of military power, which succeeded only because the people of Persia rallied round the Safawids in defence of their land (but hardly, as yet, their “nation”) against the Ottoman and Uzbeg menaces. The price which they paid was religious conformity; and, by the doubler effect of political and religious particularism, the idea of Persian nationality was in due course created.

‛8. The final proof that Shi‛ism was not a natural outcome or expression of the national Iranian genius is given by the intellectual deterioration which followed. Isolation and economic decay played their part in this; but, as Mizra Muhammad has remarked in the letter that you quote, the intellectual and literary genius of Persians lay in the field
{p.402} Mysticism. Shi‛ism in power was bitterly hostile to Mysticism—perhaps partly because of the incongruity with the authoritarian doctrine of the Shī‛ah, more (I think) because the Sūfī movement had been captured by the Sunnīs. Shi‛ism thus killed the Persian “humanitites” and left no outlet for intellectual activity except in scholasticism—for which the Persian genius seems totally unfitted. I should go further and hazard that it survived as a religion only because of the emotional outlet offered by the Muharran ceremonies. Apart from this, the average intelligent Persian, as de Gobineau remarked, seems to have sunk into a kind of sceptical religious lethargy.’



(1) The Stimulus of Hard Countries
(2) The Stimulus of New Ground
(3) The Stimulus of Blows

Various examples from Hellenic and Western history are given to illustrate the point that a sudden crushing defeat is apt to stimulate the defeated party to set its house in order and prepare to make a victorious response.

(4) The Stimulus of Pressures
(5) The Stimulus of Penalizations

Certain classes of races have suffered for centuries from various forms of penalization imposed upon them by other classes or races who have had the mastery over them. Penalized classes or races generally respond to this challenge of being excluded from certain opportunities and privileges by putting forth exceptional energy and showing exceptional capacity in such directions as are left open to them—much as the blind develop exceptional sensitiveness of hearing. Slavery is perhaps the heaviest of penalizations, but out of the hordes of slaves imported into Italy from the Eastern Mediterranean during the last two centuries B.C. arose a 'freedmen' class which proved alarmingly powerful. From this slave world, too, came the new religions of the internal proletariat, among them Chrisitianity.

The fortunes of various groups of conquered Christian peoples under ‛Osmanli rule are examined from the same standpoint—particularly the case of the Phanariots. This example and that of the Jews are used to prove that so-called racial characteristics are not really racial at all but are due to the historical experiences of the communitites in question.


(1) Enough and Too Much

(2) Comparisons in Three Terms

None the less, it can be proved that challenges can be too severe: i.e. the maximum challenge will not always produce the optimum response. The Viking emigrants from Norway responded splendidly to the severe challenge of Iceland but collapsed before the severer challenge of Greenland. Massachusetts presented European colonists with a severer challenge than 'Dixie' and evoked a better response, but Labrador, presenting a severer challenge still, proved too much for them. Other examples follow: e.g. the stimulus of blows can be severe, especially if prolonged, as in the effect of the Hannibalic War on Italy. The Chinese are stimulated by the social challenge involved in emigrating to Malaya but are defeated by the severer social challenge of a white man's country, e.g. California. Finally, varying degrees of challenge presented by civilizations to neighboring barbarians are reviewed.

(3) Two Abortive Civilizations

...Two groups of barbarians on the frontiers of Western Christendom in the first chapter of its history were so stimulated that they began to evolve rival civilizations of their own which were, however, nipped in the bud, namely the Far Western Celtic Christians (in Ireland and Iona) and the Scandinavian Vikings. These two cases are considered and the consequences that might have ensued if these rivals had not been swallowed and absorbed by the Christian civilization radiating from Rome and the Rhineland.

(4) The Impact of Islam on the Christendoms

To conclude this part of our inquiry let us see whether the impact of Islam upon Christendom will furnish yet another of those 'comparison in three terms' with which the reader is by this time familiar. We have already noticed in another connexion a challenge from Islam which evokes an optimum response. The challenge presented to the Franks in the eighth century of the Christian Era evokes a counter-offensive extending over many centuries which not only drove the adherents of Islam out of the Iberian Peninsula but also, travelling on beyond its original objective, carried the Spaniards and Portuguese overseas to all the continents of the world. In this case, too, we may notice a phenomenon which we have already observed in considering the defeat of the Far Western and Scandinavian civilization. Before it was entirely rooted out and destroyed the Iberian Muslim culture was exploited for the benefit of its victorious antagonist. The scholars of Muslim Spain contributed unintentionally to the philosophical edifice erected by the medieval Western Christian schoolmen, and some of the works of the Hellenic philosopher Aristotle first reached the Western Christian World through Arabic translations. It is also true that many 'Oriental' influences on Western culture which have been attributed to infiltration through the Crusades' principalities in Syria really came from Muslim Iberia.

The Muslim attack on Western Christendom through Iberia and over the Pyrenees was not really as formidable as it looked owing to the length of the line of communication between this front and the fountain-heads of Islamic energy in South-Western Asia, and it is not difficult to find a quarter in which the lines of communication were shorter and the Muslim attack proved in consequence too severe. This region is Anatolia, at that time the citadel of Orthodox Christian Civilization. In this first phase of their attack the Arab aggressors sought to put 'Rum' (as they called it, i.e. 'Rome') out of addiction and to overwhelm Orthodox Christendom altogether by striking right across Anatolia at the Imperial City itself. Constantinople was unsuccessfully besieged by the Muslims in A.D. 673-7 and again in 717-18. Even after the failure of the second siege, when the frontier between the two Powers settled down along the line of the Taurus Mountains, what remained of the Anatolian domain of Orthodox Christendom was regularly raided by the Muslims twice a year.

The Orthodox Christians responded to this pressure by a political expedient; and this response was successful on a short view, inasmuch as it availed to keep the Arabs at bay. On a long view, on the other hand, it was unfortunate on account of its pernicious effects on the inward life and growth of the Orthodox Christian Society. The expedient was the evocation of a 'ghost' of the Roman Empire in the Orthodox Christian World by Leo the Syrian, about two generations before the same feat was attempted unsuccessfully (and therefore more or less innocuously) by Charlemagne in the West. The most disastrous effect of Leo the Syrian's achievement was the aggrandizement of the Byzantine State, at the expense of the Orthodox church, and the consequent internecine hundred years war between the Eastern Roman Empire and the Patriarchate on the other. This self-inflicted wound was the death of the Orthodox Christian Society in its original form and its original home. These facts suffice to show that the challenge presented by the Islamic impact to Orthodox Christendom, unlike its challenge to Western Christendom, was excessive.