Katyn in Nuremberg
A Cup Which Was Not Drunk to the Dregs
The massacre of Katyn, perpetrated by the Soviets was built into the bill of indictment of the Nuremberg War Crimes Tribunal.
This iniquity was the result of Soviet pressures. Not only was it against the opinion of the three other powers present, but they practised true blackmail to arrive at their end1. That they reached that point remains for them a success (which avèrerait a victory in Pyrrhus), and for the Nuremberg War Crimes Tribunal, an indelible spot.
Thus, Katyn appears in the Count of Indictment No. 3, “War Crimes”, which refer to the subparagraph B of Article 6 of the Statute of the Court.
The Soviets hoped very much to make allot of Katyn with the Germans. They hoped well that they could do without testimonies, that the report on which the charge was made, would be accepted without discussion, and the culpability of defendants would be regarded as acquired office. It was a fiasco. The rights of defense were respected. The judges required that the Soviets support their "report" of testimonies more conclusively2. And they agreed to the request of defense counsels to question their own witnesses. These two things the Soviets were violently opposed, but in the end could not prevent.
Katyn was a true test of the equity of the lawsuit. The test was from the beginning, from even the mention of Katyn in the Bill of Indictment, but the continuation of the lawsuit is révèlerait with the honor of the judges and the court.
The Soviet Attempt to Muzzle Defense
The Soviet charge rested only on the report which they had manufactured to accuse the Germans, document USSR-54. To prevent any discussion of the aforementioned report, the Soviets tried to base it on an Article 21 of the Statute of the International Court of Nuremberg.
This Article concerned the same preoccupations with a diligence as Article 19 of the Statute which stipulated:
"Article 19: The Court will not be bound by the technical rules relating to the administration of the evidence. It will adopt and apply as much as possible a fast and nonformal procedure and will admit any means which it will estimate to have a convincing value. "3It should immediately be stressed that these Articles were not employed arbitrarily or in such a way that the rights of defense would have been ridiculed. On the contrary, as we shall see.
Several cases show, for example, that Article 19 was not applied in a way which would darkened the rights of defense. Thus on January 2, 1946, the President precise with the lawyer of Kaltenbrunner, Kauffmann, concerning a declaration under oath accepted under the terms of this Article, that the Court will examine any request emitted by defense in order to cross-examine the witness who had made the statement in question.4
It did nothing but state again what it had already said on November 28, 1945, namely that:
"if defense wishes to proceed to the cross-examination of the witness [ author of a declaration under oath accepted under the terms of Article 19 ] it will have all freedom to do so." 5December 14, 1945 it specified that the Court preferred to hear a witness rather, when this one was available, than to receive (under the terms of Article 19) his testimony in the form of a written declaration because that "deprives Defense of the advisability of cross-examining the witness" 6.
There was all the philosophy of the statute and the lawsuit: to allow the speed and the effectiveness certainly, but without harming the rights of defense.
Article 19 is justified in addition from a strictly legal point of view, within the framework of the accusatory procedure (of Anglo-Saxon type) used in Nuremberg as John F Murphy7 explains it.
Let us return in Article 21:
“Article 21: The Court will not require that the proof of facts of public notoriety be reported, but will hold them for asset. It will also regard as authentic evidence the documents and official reports of the Governments of the United Nations, including those drawn up by the Commissions established in the various countries combined for the investigations into the war crimes as well as the official reports of the audiences and the decisions of the military tribunals or other courts of the unspecified one of the United Nations.”8The interest of this Article is included/understood, and chair it Court recalled on several occasions that it made it possible to advance quickly in this lawsuit river. To understand the context in which Article 19 and Article 21 of the statute fit it is necessary to hold account of the procedural characteristics of the lawsuit, clearly dominated by Anglo-Saxon legal philosophy, but morning of European right. See the work of Telford Taylor, or that of François de Fontette9. The second part of Article 21 concerns, in the same vision of diligence and effectiveness, automatic acceptance by the Court of all that is in an official report emanating from a allied government. And only of these. There are examples of documents presented by the charge like acceptable under the terms of Article 21, but rejected by the tribunal10. The English version, which is taken, known as more precisely than the court “will take judicial note” of the evoked reports. It is a question for him of not having to discuss the relevance the reports in questions. One is halfway between the concept of “proof” and “exhibit”.
The reading of the lawsuit shows that Article 21 relates to well the admissibility of documents presented to the Court, but does not suppose of anything of their use by the Court, i.e. of interpretation that will make judgement of them. It was a question of accelerating the process because one knew pertinently that the admissible nature of certain documents could be the object, during a lawsuit, of discussions without end.
Telford Taylor points out indeed that the Court could grant to a document considered to be admissible according to Article 21, "the value which it would judge good" 11.
John F Murphy specifies the legal reasons and techniques which made necessary Article 21. He writes in particular:
"The authors of the Charter wisely operated one the premise that every such document represented the product of collecting and evaluating has a multitude of depositions, protocols of inspection and other evidence which there was no special need without reason to review once again" 12John F Murphy specifies well:
"without special reason", which shows well that it is an Article whose interpretation was not to harm the rights of defense.
The Soviets called upon an extremely literal interpretation of Article 21. Indeed, their charge was based on a report (document USSR-54) assembled of all parts in order to manufacture a German culpability. As it acted of an official report, the Court had taken "judicial note of it", under the terms of Article 21.
The Soviet charge supported that the reports accepted under the terms of Article 21 were not debatable and could not be discussed. As we shall see, this interpretation was categorically rejected by the judges.
The Court had obtained flexible rules since the rule no.11 of the rules of procedures stipulated that nothing would prevent "the Court at some time that it is in the interest of the equity and the speed of the debates, to deviate from these rules, to bring there amendments and additions" 13
In the interest of the equity of the debates, the Court obtained faculty to amend or interpret the payment with which it had been equipped. And it is what it made to refuse interpretation extremist, highly inequitable, of Article 21 by the Soviet charge, so that never the court did not consider that a document accepted under the terms of Article 21 constituted a final proof, and thus deprived defense to make criticism of it.
The President clearly stated, in connection with Katyn even. June 3, 1946, the lawyer of the accused Dr. Stahmer, disputing the Soviet interpretation of Article 21, declared:
"General Rudenko wishes to refuse my application of evidence while calling upon, I believe, Article 21 of the Statute. I do not believe that the stipulations of this Article can cancel this request "The President of the Court abounds then in the direction of Dr. Stahmer while stating:
"Doctor Stahmer, I believe that the Court already decided that this did not prevent the summoning of witnesses. "14However the Soviets were going to redouble efforts to arrive to their ends... Here what writes, in connection with this episode, Telford Taylor which was, let us recall it, prosecutor in Nuremberg:
"Dr. Stahmer then asked for the Court the authorization of quote six witnesses, including five officers who had been confined close to the wood of Katyn. March 12, 1946, the Court examined the request in camera and approved it by three votes, those of Lawrence, Biddle and of Vabres. The official report declared:It is clear that, in comparison with Article 21, the "commissions established [... ] for the investigations into the war crimes" included the Soviet special Commission Report, whose contents could be recognized like formal proof by the Court ("judicial note"), which would grant the value then to him that it would judge good. But Nikitchenko vigorously defended an interpretation of Article 21 which gave an obligatory force to these documents and prevented the Court from hearing defense. Under the terms of what the defendants could not tackle the conclusion of the commission, namely that the Germans were guilty massacre of Katyn.GeneralNikitchenko refused to vote and asked that its reasons appear in the official report as follows: "I cannot take part in this vote because the discussion and the setting with the voices by the Court of the question of knowing if an official governmental act can be disputed is in obvious contradiction with Article 21 of the statute"
It was an interpretation absurdity of Article 21 and, for the second time Katyn created a very delicate situation within the Court. In Berlin, when Nikitchenko had claimed an adjournment to leave time in the Kremlin to modify the number of massacred Poles with Katyn, the other judges had yielded because Biddle feared the departure of Nikitchenko (see p. 141-143). At present, the Soviets seemed also intransigent, but Biddle extremely precisely understood that the other judges and itself could not yield: to let the Soviet public ministry affirm that the Germans were guilty massacre and prevent those from answering this charge removed, indeed, any value with the lawsuit. The appearance of the witnesses quoted by Stahmer was approved by a new vote and was announced, however that Nikitchenko expressed its dissension. Rudenko required of the Court to reconsider its decision, but it made it in terms that Biddle qualified the "immoderate ones" and by showing the Court not to make its duty and to make a "coarse error". April 6, when the Court examined the request, Biddle arrived at the meeting with ammunition, in fact a reasoned opinion written by Herbert Wechsler, who, in terms chosen, but powerful, reduced to nothing the request for Rudenko.
When the conference started, Biddle declared that the request for Rudenko was so arrogant and so libelous that in the United States "the author of such a document would be continued for contempt of court" and perhaps that it was necessary to send Rudenko "in prison forthwith". Addressing itself to Nikitchenko, it asked him which measurement it proposed. The General, struck, marmonna something of inintelligible. On what Biddle lute the opinion reasoned with its listeners, specifying that it "could be read with the audience before one stops the General Rudenko".
Nikitchenko then made feet and hands to prevent that the reasoned opinion was not given public and the judges "compromised" by deciding that the request for Rudenko "was to be rejected and that one would give no reason of his rejection". The reasoned opinion of Biddle "was classified" in the files of the Court. Nikitchenko expressed its dissension, but renonça to want to impose its interpretation of Article 21. "15 Thus the Court, in transfer, had decided, against the Soviet opinion and its interpretation of Article 21, to hear the German witnesses, but, and for the only time of all the lawsuit, the Rudenko prosecutor lodges a request for re-examination of the question, which was examined with eight-closed. It is necessary to read what judge Francis Biddle itself wrote of this episode there:
"[... ] the Russian prosecutor lodges a request for reexamination immediately the question. It was the only request for re-examination which us [ judges ] received. Its terms were immoderate: the court, claimed Rudenko, had badly built the Statute, had violated its duties, and commetttait a gorssière error. The request followed the sales leaflet of Nikitchenko and indicated that it had cooperated there.Biddle concludes that to avoid the humiliation of an arrest of the Soviet prosecutor Rudenko and the public reading of the opinion of Biddle and Wechsler, Nikitchenko would not be opposed to the quotation German witnesses any more.
It was necessary to act as this occasion. With our meeting of the afternoon I asked my fellow-members [ in French in the text ] to grant the privilege to me to let itself speak, although it was not on the agenda, but because it acted of a business of the most extreme importance for us all. Because it related to the integrity of the members of the Court, their honor, and their competence.
The fellow-members were now with listening.
One of the prosecutors—I looked at the General Nikitchenko—had carried an insulting, arrogant, and unfounded attack against the Court, an authority which would mark the history like the most important court of the world. I did not know which rule was applied in the other countries. But in mine, the author of such an insult would be accused for insult. Perhaps even as in this case, extreme, very precise, we would send it directly in prison—there could not be dispute.
"That think about it, Général? read the request of the General Rudenko? What propose as solution? "General Nikitchenko was disconcerted. It marmona that he had read the request, but rather in diagonal. He did not have anything to propose. The French were amused—they had included/understood what I prepared. The British were surprised—they had not been consulted.
I produced an opinion, that Herbert Weschler and myself had written with much care the previous night. With their permission I would read it to them. This reading could take place in public, with the Court, immediately before stopping the General Rudenko.
I read the opinion. It refuted the assertion as what the governmental reports were to be accepted like "irrefutable proof of the established facts"—an assertion "not supported by the Statute and intrinsically unreasonable in oneself" the Soviet prosecutor made a coarse error in his interpretation of the Statute. "16
The Soviet interpretation of Article 21 was clearly reduced to nothing and was rejected: the defendants were not held guilty a massacre of Katyn under the terms of Article 21 of the statute of the Court. And they could be defended of these charges.
Whoever would dare to suggest the opposite, or that Soviet interpretation was accepted, would make coarse a falsification.17
The Success of Defense
Three witnesses were finally heard for defense. These testimonys are partly reproduced in the work of Jean-Marc Varaut18. They were overpowering for the Soviet Union. These meetings were a true fiasco for the Soviet charge and any mention of Katyn disappeared from the Judgement.
All the historians, all the serious authors who treated the Nuremberg Tribunal and tackled the question of Katyn agree for saying that the disappearance of this load in the Judgement, accuse, by defect, the Soviets, and mean that the Germans were not condemned for Katyn.
Let us leave the word with some of these authors.
"Katyn disappears simply from the Judgement, which constitutes to some extent the tacit consent of the Soviet culpability. "19
"After the interrogation of the war criminals Nazis (March 8 and June 4, 1946)—as well as chiefs of the 537e German Regiment of the transmissions stationed at the end of August 1941 close to Katyn—and the deliberation of the judges (1st and July 2) which concluded after having heard colonel Ahrens and the officers of the Regiment, with impossibility of retaining against the count of indictment of the massacre of Katyn, this count of indictment was withdrawn and thus does not appear in the verdict returned on September 30, 1946 in Nuremberg.Telford Taylor which was a prosecutor in Nuremberg written on Katyn:
The Judgement of Nuremberg is, in fact, a verdict in the business of Katyn: there were two murderers supposed responsible for the crime; with the end of the Lawsuit, overpowering on the other points, one had to give up the loads against a suspect, although it was at the time of the Judgement in position of weakness vis-a-vis to the other which formed part of the judges and the winners. One abstained from showing the other suspect, become combined in June 1941, but while proceeding by this simple elimination, the culprit was logically designated... since the Army Polonaise had not made of collective suicide that at least was sure, and that it "had not left in Mandchourie", like had claimed it Stalin in 1941, before the discovery of the mass grave. "20
"In the business of Katyn, the circumstances were such as only the Soviet Union or Germany could have perpetrated the atrocity. The only way, for one or the other of the parts, to show its innocence was to prove the culpability of the other. "21Speaking about the pleading of lawyer of Goering, he writes that it acted:
"[ the only satisfactory demonstration proving that one could not show in a plausible way the Germans of the massacre of Katyn" 22Joe Heydecker and Johannes Leeb, both present at the time of the lawsuit, write:
"Never still, in the history of humanity, as many monstrous crimes were not reproached such a small number of defendants. However, the court, in its verdict, will refuse to hold account of certain fixed prices. It will estimate indeed that the evidence subjected by the charge is insufficient to establish the culpability of the Nazis chiefs clearly. It is in particular the case in the business of Katyn, which will end in the total victory of defense "23 "In any case, the Soviet charge will not insist any more on the business of Katyn? Does this abandonment constitute a consent? In Nuremberg, many people are persuaded of it. "24Leon Poliakov, who also attended to him the lawsuit, writing:
"the Court of Nuremberg appeared to draw its conclusion, since in its verdict, it did not speak about this business, and thus did not put it at the load Germans [... ] A Is, the Polish communist government composed by Moscow, the Beirut government, did not even mention the name of Katyn in the list of the German crimes committed in Poland, and that can be regarded as a consent" 25Jean-Marc Varaut writes that with the exit depositions witnesses of defense:
"[... ] the general impression is that Stalin made assassinate on suspicion the framing of the Polish army"26It concludes like Poliakov:
"the business of Katyn will be taken again by the Court in its Judgement [... ]. the Soviet Union will not insist any more on the business, without never recognizing the crime. And the Polish communist government does not mention the name of Katyn in the list of the German crimes committed in Poland. "27Michael Bildis, who was a president Historical Association in Great Britain, writing:
"By the closed of the trial it was becoming plainer that the crime belonged not to 1941, have alleged, goal to 1940 when the area was still under the control of the Red Army. Final By excluding from the Judgement all reference to this matter, the Western members of the Tribunal were paying silent and embarrassed testimony to the fact that in Eastern Europe, before have well after Germany and the USRR became open enemies in June 1941, both the Nazi and the Stalinist modes had pursued to their irreconcilable goals with comparable ruthlessness. "28What means, in short, that the culpability of the Soviets clearly appeared during the lawsuit and that the disappearance of Katyn of the Judgement takes act of this fact.
All agree for saying that the culpability of the Soviets appeared, that that of the Germans disappeared. It is well what the absence of Katyn in the Judgement means. It would be grotesque, and opposite with the truth, to affirm that the Germans were condemned for Katyn...
Reading of the minutes of the lawsuit, as well as the accounts which were made by it (see in particular Telford Taylor and Jean-Marc Varaut), reveals the importance that the Soviets attached to Katyn. Not only they had assembled a board of inquiry can, but they had been ready to go until the crisis to include Katyn in the charge. One can be sure that if they had regarded their position as shown at the end of the audiences, they would have made so that Katyn is mentionnér in the jugement29.
They held well too much to spread out the German "culpability", relating to Katyn, with the eyes of the world (only means for them of clearing itself) not to protest high and strong their "victory" if they had been able to obtain one from them. It was a defeat, as one saw. It is in this context, within the framework of the Soviet eagerness which it is necessary to read and interpret the absence of Katyn in the Soviet indictment (that one does not point out enough) and in the Judgement. This absence, it is well the Soviet incapacity to be able to evoke Katyn after the fiasco of the audiences, it is well the defeat of the Soviet attempt, it is well the recognition of German innocence. It is underlined by the absence, brought back by Poliakov and Varaut, of the evocation of Katyn by the Polish government communist pro-Soviet (i.e. with the boot of the USSR), in the list of the German crimes committed in Poland. One can say without being mistaken that if the USSR had considered that the Judgement given to Nuremberg could be interpreted like a judgement of German culpability for Katyn, it would have imposed the mention of Katyn to the Poles.
In a book on the lawsuit, published with the Editions of Moscow into 196930, Katyn is not mentioned anywhere. After so much of insistence to show the Germans of this crime, these silences say clearly which was interpretation by the Soviets themselves of the absence of Katyn in the Judgement.
Nuremberg, an Equitable Lawsuit
That it is allowed to me to point out the Article no.16 statute, item IV heading "Lawsuit equitable of marked":
"Article 16: In order to ensure that the defendants are judged with equity, the following procedure will be adopted:And indeed, the defendants them even were surprised by the balanced and equitable character of the lawsuit! Here what Jean-Marc Varaut writes:
a) The Bill of indictment will comprise the complete elements specifying in detail the loads raised against the defendants. A copy of the Bill of indictment and all the additional documents, translated in a language which it understands, will be given to shown within a reasonable time before the judgement;
b) During any preliminary interrogation with the lawsuit of an defendant, this one will have the right to give all explanations referring itself to the loads raised against him;
c) the preliminary interrogations and the lawsuit of marked will have to be led in a language which the defendant understands or to be translated in this language;
d) The defendants will have the right to ensure themselves their defense in front of the Court, or to be made assist of a lawyer;
e) the defendants will have capital duty during the lawsuit, either personally, or via their lawyer, all evidence in support of their defense and to put questions with all the witnesses produced by the Charge. "31
"the President will get busy throughout lawsuit to be made respect the concept of equitable lawsuit. The freedom of choice left with marked [ concerning their lawyers ] by the statute will surprise several of them [... ]With the end of the lawsuit, 33 witnesses for the prosecution and 61 witnesses for the defence will have been heard, without counting the 19 marked ones who appeared personally with the bar. Defense moreover produced 143 depositions écrites.33
The defendants, even when they denounce the lawsuit like the lawsuit of the winners with overcome, recognize the impartiality of the president. In time even where it withdraws the word with the lawyers who want to pre-empt the time of their interventions, it reprimand representatives of the public Ministry when they denature a document by a selective reading or their comments [... ]
It is understood that the lawyers and the defendants were unanimous to recognize and to rent the impartiality of Lord Geoffrey Lawrence [ the President ]. He was exemplary throughout lawsuit, the Judge, such that dream it oppressed and the powerful ones fear it, and that the powerful deposed ones also wait them when the charge equalizes them with their victims. "32
Those which would like to make believe that the Nuremberg Tribunal was iniquitous commetraient a historical swindle...
Let us leave the word of the end with François de Fontette: "One easily sees the tight hank of the problems arising, which they are legal, historical, political, sociological or philosophical. Between the two extremes of the blow of gun in the nape of the neck and of the public lesson of morals, how much wise the creation of an international penal jurisdiction appears; that is all the more true as one observed a remarkable weighting and a balance there since one did not hesitate to discharge three marked. The freedom of word of the lawyers (certain members of the NSDAP), the adoption of a procedure for a great Anglo-Saxon and thus accusatory share, the possibility for the defendants themselves of testifying in their own cause are as many elements which contributed to bring to the debates large serious and a relative serenity. The length even of the debates, 22 volumes which are the reproduction and 20 volumes of documents attest meticulousness with which the questions were studied, carried out interrogations and heard defense. It is enough to oppose the assassination and the scandalous exposure of the corpses of Mussolini and Clara Petacci to the legal execution of the criminals Nazis after a lengthily matured legal sentence. The first mode raises of the wild popular anger, the second is the expression of a penal international law undoubtedly applied for the first time in all its rigour, but it is necessary well that there is first once and justice is not revenge.
Justice does not cease existing because it is at the end of the drama, on the side of the victorious force. Here a long time that Blaise Pascal meant it in final matter: "justice without the force is impotent... the force without justice is tyrannical. It is thus necessary to put together justice and the force and for this reason to make that what is right is strong or that what is strong is right "It is with that that to Nuremberg one after a fashion arrived when the lance of Athéna meets the sword of Thémis, then measurement is good." 34
1. Telford Taylor, Prosecutor in Nuremberg, Threshold, 1995, p. 328.
2. Tusa, Ann & John. The Nuremberg Trial, Birmingham, Alabama: Notable The Trials Library, Division of Gryphon Editions, Inc, 1990, p. 412. See nizkor.org
3. city in Telford Taylor, Prosecutor in Nuremberg, Threshold, 1995, p. 665.
4. Nuremberg Trial Proceedings, vol. 4 p. 297.
5. Nuremberg Trial Proceedings, vol. 2 p. 351.
6. Nuremberg Trial Proceedings, vol. 3 p. 544.
7. John F Murphy, "Norms of criminal procedure international At the military court", in G Ginsburgs and V.N. Kudriatsev (eds), The Nuremberg Trials and International Law, Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1990, p. 72. It is useful to quote the passage concerned:
"A continental major difference between common law and legal systems is that the to lath d?s not employ exclusionary rules of evidence. Short Rather the approach of the is to allow most evidence in, exclude it only yew it is clearly irrelevant gold prejudicial, and then decide one how persuasive it is. The American attitude At London was that, since the common law rules of evidence were developed for uses in jury trials, there was No need to insist that they Be used in this trial. Have has consequence, Article 19 of the Charter provided that the Tribunal would not Be bound by technical rules of evidence and would "admitted any evidence which it deems to cuts probative been worth." "
On the accusatory character of the procedure and the course of the lawsuit, to also see Jean-Marc Varaut, the Nuremberg Tribunal, Hachette/Pluriel, 1993, p. 49-50.
8. city in Telford Taylor, Prosecutor in Nuremberg, Threshold, 1995, p. 665.
9. François de Fontette, the Nuremberg Tribunal, PUF, I That-know n°3221, 1996, p. 62-94.
10 Nuremberg Trial Proceedings, vol. 7 p. 116.
11 Telford Taylor, op.cit., p. 484.
12 John F Murphy, "Norms of criminal procedure international At the military court", op.cit., p. 85. One will however read the pages 83-85 which justify the adoption of Article 21 of the charter. 13 City in François de Fontette, op.cit., p. 28. 14 Lawsuit of the large war criminals in front of the International Military Tribunal, Nuremberg, November
14 October 1945-1st, 1946, Nuremberg, 1947-1949 (41 volumes), XV, p. 302.
15 Telford Taylor, op.cit., p. 483-485. 16 Translated (by the author) of Francis Biddle, In Brief Authority, Garden Cityn N.Y.: Doubleday, 1962, p. 415-4
16, quoted in Michael R. Marrus, The Nuremberg War Crimes Trial 1945-46, A Documentary History, Bedford Books, 1997, p. 101-102.
17 The negationnist Robert Faurisson made such a falsification in a text published in a booklet negationnist, "Katyn in Nuremberg", Revue of Révisionniste[sic History ], n°2 (August-September-October 1990). He supports there that the Stalinist interpretation of Article 21 of the statute of the court was accepted. It acts obviously of a shameless lie. But one could not be surprised that the sectarian negationnists join the Stalinist spirits... Moreover the loop is being buckled since the negationnist Roger Garaudy, a former Stalinist fanatic, took again exactly the same lie claiming that the Soviet report would have been "indisputable" because of Article 21 (the myths founders of the Israeli policy, Samiszdat, 1996, p. 104). The reading of the article of Faurisson and Garaudy on the same subject shows besides as Garaudy did not make any research and was satisfied to plagiarize Faurisson. Let us recall that Garaudy was at the end of 1940 Stalinist keen which denied the existence of Gulag...
18 Jean-Marc Varaut, the Nuremberg Tribunal, Hachette/Pluriel, 1993, p. 138-145.
19 Annette Wieviorka, the Nuremberg Tribunal, Editions West-France, 1995, p. 92.
20 Alexandra Viatteau, "How the question of Katyn was treated in Nuremberg", in Annette Wieviorka, the lawsuits of Nuremberg and Tokyo, Editions Complexes, 1996., p. 152-153.
21 Telford Taylor, op.cit., p. 483.
22 Telford Taylor, op.cit., p. 492.
23 Joe Heydecker and Johannes Leeb, the Nuremberg Tribunal, trad. Max Roth, Corrêa - Buchet Chastel, 1959, p. 313.
24 Joe Heydecker and Johannes Leeb, op.cit., p. 321.
25. Leon Poliakov, the Nuremberg Tribunal, Julliard, coll. Files, 1971, p. 205.
26. Jean-Marc Varaut, op.cit., p. 144-145.
27. Jean-Marc Varaut, op.cit., p. 145.
28. Michael Bildis, "Victor' S Justices? The Nuremberg Court ", History Today, flight 45 (5), 1995, p. 44.
29. In an older version of this study, we wrote that the Soviets had not mentioned Katyn in their indictment. This assertion was false insofar as Rudenko, mentions well Katyn, July 29, 1946, in the Soviet indictment. It does not make any demonstration however - it mentions only "the German fascistic assassins who destroyed 11 000 Polish officers prisoner of war in Katyn"—and is satisfied to make as if it were acquired that Katyn could be charged to the Germans, which the debates had made it possible to draw aside, as one saw. Rudenko could hardly better make insofar as Stahmer, the lawyer of Göring, would make, in its pleading "a satisfactory demonstration proving that one could not show in a plausible way the Germans of the massacre of Katyn" (Telford Taylor, Procureur in Nuremberg, op.cit., p. 492). However, no other indictment mentions Katyn and this mention, by the Soviet prosecutor, could not be called upon to claim that in Nuremberg one considered the Germans guilty of Katyn. All the historians find themselves on this point, like one saw it.
30 Poltorak, Arkadi Iosifovitch, the Nuremberg Tribunal, Editions of Moscow, 1969.
31. Telford Taylor, op.cit., p. 664 32. Jean-Marc Varaut, op.cit., p. 63-69. 33. Jean-Marc Varaut, op.cit., p. 70. 34. François de Fontette, op.cit., p. 5-6.